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It is the best of times and worst of times for the right to
effective assistance of counsel. Consider two recent, contrasting lines of cases from the Supreme Court. In the first,
the Court affirmed that the defendant’s right to competent
representation extends to plea bargaining and encompasses
advice regarding the deportation consequences of a conviction.1 Call this the ‘‘expansive-right’’ line of cases. In the
second, the Court brusquely overturned a series of habeas
corpus grants on ineffective assistance grounds, emphasizing the high barriers that federal courts must overcome
before they may award relief on the basis of unconstitutionally poor representation.2 Call this the ‘‘narrow-remedy’’
line of cases.
My purpose in this article is to try to make sense of these
two lines of cases and to suggest a path forward. For the
past twelve years, beginning with Williams v. Taylor,3 the
Court has been remarkably active in the ineffective
assistance area—much more so than at any previous time
in the Court’s history. Yet, the Court’s two dozen decisions
since 2000 have a schizophrenic quality, which is exemplified by the two lines of cases noted above. The Court’s
mixed messages on counsel competency can hardly inspire
consistent, vigorous enforcement of this important constitutional right in the lower courts.
Much of the difficulty stems from the peculiarities of
federal habeas law. Further invigoration by the Court of the
right to effective assistance is thus most likely to come in
cases directly from the state courts, which are not subject to
habeas restrictions. It is probably no coincidence that the
Court bypassed habeas in two of the three expansive-right
cases. Indeed, in recent years, the Court has quietly been
taking a greater proportion of its ineffective assistance cases
directly from the state courts. The Court would do well to
continue along this trajectory.
Advocates have an important role to play in this process.
Beginning with Williams and continuing through the recent
expansive-right cases, the Court has displayed a new
willingness to give constitutional force to established
defense practice standards, particularly those promulgated
by the American Bar Association.4 This is a welcome
development. But further progress seems unlikely in
habeas cases. This reality underscores the need for state
postconviction counsel to develop strong factual records

and legal arguments in the state courts in support of ineffective assistance claims. Not only do these provide a necessary foundation for compelling certiorari petitions, but
they may also encourage the state courts themselves to take
the lead in improving ineffective assistance law. Notably,
the Supreme Court’s recent expansive-right cases relied, in
part, on earlier state court decisions—the lower courts led,
and the Supreme Court followed.
In developing these points, the article proceeds as
follows. Part I sketches the doctrinal backdrop to the
expansive-right and narrow-remedy cases, focusing
particularly on the tensions in the Court’s pivotal Williams
decision. Part II describes the two recent lines of cases in
more detail. Finally, Part III suggests a path forward,
highlighting the potential for habeas bypass to facilitate the
Court’s clarification and invigoration of the right to effective
assistance.
I. Williams v. Taylor: A Breakthrough for the Right to
Effective Assistance, Sort of
A. State of the Law Before Williams

The Supreme Court first articulated the test for ineffective
assistance claims in 1984 in Strickland v. Washington.5
Although Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority,
endorsed the principle of a constitutional right to competent representation, her description and application of the
legal standards demonstrated little willingness actually to
award a new trial or other relief based on allegations of
ineffective assistance.
O’Connor’s opinion established a now-familiar
two-prong test. First, the defendant alleging ineffective
assistance must show that his lawyer’s performance fell
below the standard of ‘‘reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms.’’6 Second, the defendant must show
prejudice, that is, ‘‘a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’’7 Of course, by placing the
burden of demonstrating prejudice on the defendant,
Strickland seemingly turned the conventional harmless
error test for constitutional violations on its head.
As to the first prong of the Strickland test, Justice
O’Connor repeatedly emphasized that ‘‘[j]udicial scrutiny of
counsel’s performance must be highly deferential’’8; ‘‘the
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court should recognize that counsel is strongly presumed to
have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant
decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.’’9 Although O’Connor recognized that ‘‘[p]revailing
norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association
standards and the like’’ could be consulted in the reasonableness analysis, she also made clear that ‘‘they are only
guides. No particular set of detailed rules for counsel’s
conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of
circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of
legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent
a criminal defendant.’’10 As if to underscore the marginal
value of bar standards, O’Connor did not even make passing reference to them in applying her test and finding the
performance of defendant David Washington’s counsel
reasonable.11
Lurking in the background of Strickland was a fear that
overly generous standards would ‘‘encourage the proliferation of ineffectiveness challenges,’’ which would not only
burden the court system but also potentially impair
attorney-client relationships and discourage lawyers from
taking court-assigned cases.12 Then, too, there was the
problem that ineffective assistance claims, by their nature,
tended to be brought long after trial in collateral attacks on
the conviction or sentence (as happened in Strickland
itself).13 The close practical association between ineffective
assistance claims and collateral review did nothing to make
the claims more attractive to the Court. Then-Justice
Rehnquist had long and forcefully articulated the view that
trials should be the ‘‘main event’’ and not simply a ‘‘tryout
on the road’’ for later postconviction proceedings.14 Indeed,
by the time Strickland was decided, Rehnquist, joined by
O’Connor and other habeas skeptics on the Court, had
already been engaged for some time in a successful effort to
restrict habeas remedies.15 Although the Strickland decision
itself focused on substantive constitutional rights, it may be
appropriate to view Strickland as part of the line of habeas
cases that were intended to minimize meddling by federal
courts with state court judgments (especially death
sentences).
In the decade following Strickland, the Court did nothing to dispel the perception that the ineffective assistance
claim was little more than a doctrinal placeholder—something that had to be recognized in principle as a possible
basis for postconviction relief in order to prevent the right
to counsel from too obviously collapsing into a meaningless
formality, but that ought in practice to be discouraged
through strong presumptions against the defendant. The
Court’s initial line of post-Strickland cases culminated with
its 1993 decision in Lockhart v. Fretwell.16 In Fretwell, as in
Strickland itself, the Court affirmed a death sentence over
the defendant’s claim that he received ineffective assistance
in his capital sentencing proceeding. Although not entirely
clear in its import, certain language in Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s opinion for the majority might be understood
to raise the prejudice bar even higher than Strickland had
set it. For instance, Rehnquist wrote, ‘‘To set aside

a conviction or sentence solely because the outcome would
have been different but for counsel’s error may grant the
defendant a windfall to which the law does not entitle
him.’’17
B. The Williams Breakthrough

After Fretwell, the Supreme Court essentially lapsed into
silence on ineffective assistance until Williams, seven years
later. Two developments in the interim may have prompted
some rethinking on the Court about ineffective assistance,
particularly by Justices O’Connor and Kennedy, both of
whom had been in the Fretwell majority. First, Congress—
either not understanding or not being fully satisfied with
the Court’s line of anti-habeas cases—adopted a multitude
of new statutory restrictions on habeas through the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA).18 These restrictions diminished the practical
significance of the Court’s independent efforts to pare back
habeas, and may have helped to convince O’Connor and
Kennedy that they could loosen the reins a bit on the
development of the substantive right to effective assistance
without fear of a ‘‘proliferation of ineffectiveness
challenges’’ at the federal habeas level. Second, a series of
highly publicized exonerations of death row inmates in the
1990s made more pressing than ever before concerns
about the reliability of death sentences and the competence
of appointed counsel in capital cases.19 Indeed, in the wake
of these exonerations, O’Connor herself publicly expressed
reservations about the death penalty.20
Whatever the reason, Williams—with O’Connor and
Kennedy in support—seemed to mark a sea change in the
Court’s approach to ineffective assistance.21 At the most
basic level, and in sharp contrast to Strickland and Fretwell,
a death row inmate complaining about the quality of his
representation at the sentencing phase actually won. In
particular, Williams argued that his trial counsel had failed
to discover a host of mitigating evidence that might have led
to a sentence other than death being imposed. In finding
that Williams satisfied both prongs of the Strickland test, the
Court squarely rejected the state’s (not wholly unjustified)
contention that Fretwell had raised the prejudice bar.22 Also
of note, the Court prominently cited the ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice in its holding that counsel’s efforts had
been unreasonably poor,23 suggesting a significantly more
important role for such standards than Strickland had done.
Against the backdrop of Strickland and Fretwell, Williams
was clearly a big deal. But how big? For those who hoped
Williams might point the way to a more broadly invigorated
right to effective assistance, three aspects of the case should
have been troubling. First, there was the Court’s treatment
of the AEDPA. Oddly, indeed, Williams had two separate
majority opinions. Justice Stevens wrote for one majority
on the Sixth Amendment analysis, while Justice O’Connor,
joined by Kennedy and the Court’s conservative stalwarts
(Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas), wrote for a different
majority on the meaning of the AEDPA. O’Connor and
Kennedy were the only justices who were part of both
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majorities, and it seemed almost as if what they gave with
one hand, they took away with the other. While they
supported the more expansive view of the right to effective
assistance of their liberal colleagues, they also supported
their conservative colleagues’ more restrictive view of the
power of habeas courts to provide a remedy for Sixth
Amendment violations.
The dispute in Williams turned in particular on the
meaning of one provision of the AEDPA, now codified at 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), which has since figured prominently in
a long line of post-Williams ineffective assistance cases.
This provision prohibits habeas relief for any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court, unless the adjudication
‘‘resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’’
For Justice Stevens and the liberal block, § 2254(d)(1) did
little more than to codify pre-AEDPA decisional law, leaving
intact the ability of federal habeas courts to exercise their
independent judgment concerning both pure questions of
law and applications of law to fact.24 However, for
O’Connor, Kennedy, and the conservatives, the two halves
of § 2254(d)(1) (the ‘‘contrary to’’ and the ‘‘unreasonable
application of’’ halves) implied different types of legal tests
to be used by habeas courts in reviewing different types of
state court decisions, including a new, more deferential
form of review for state court applications of law to fact.25
As O’Connor put it, ‘‘a federal habeas court may not issue
the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision
applied clearly established federal law erroneously or
incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be
unreasonable.’’26
Although the fact that Williams himself won demonstrated that the new test was not impossibly difficult to
satisfy, pessimists might have found cause for concern in
the Court’s indication that there would be some set of cases
in which state courts applied Strickland (and Williams)
‘‘erroneously or incorrectly,’’ but in which federal habeas
courts would be powerless to provide a remedy. This aspect
of Williams seems consistent with the idea that O’Connor
and Kennedy were interested in providing stronger safeguards for defendants in death penalty cases, but did not
want at the same time to open the floodgates for habeas
litigation more generally. Indeed, by leaving the meaning of
‘‘unreasonable’’ and the border between the ‘‘contrary to’’
and ‘‘unreasonable application of’’ prongs of § 2254(d)(1)
quite vague, O’Connor and Kennedy pointed the way to
a very fact-intensive, case-specific jurisprudence; whether
intentionally or not, this approach preserved wide discretion for the Court in future cases to overturn the most
troubling death sentences without creating precedent that
could be readily used by other habeas petitioners.
This leads into the second cause for concern with
Williams: the fact that it was a capital case. Although not
voiced in Williams itself, the ‘‘death is different’’ theme had
been sufficiently strong in the Court’s jurisprudence as to
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make it unwise ever to assume that constitutional principles developed in capital cases would migrate swiftly to
noncapital cases. To some extent, the Court allayed this
concern the very next year in Glover v. United States, in
which the Court, citing Williams, held that the incorrect
calculation of a defendant’s sentence under the federal
sentencing guidelines constituted ‘‘prejudice’’ under
Strickland.27 At the same time, the Court made clear that its
decision was premised on the determinate, nondiscretionary nature of the federal sentencing system then in place,28
which tended to blur the distinction between a sentencing
proceeding and a conventional criminal trial on guilt or
innocence (a blurring that also existed in capital cases29).
Left unanswered in Glover was whether and to what extent
the more aggressive approach of Williams to the review of
counsel’s performance would carry over into areas involving more discretion, especially plea bargaining and traditional sentencing. Moreover, Glover dealt only with the
prejudice prong of Strickland, and expressly left open that
possibility that the performance analysis might be less rigorous if what was at issue was ‘‘merely’’ a few additional
months of imprisonment.30 Finally, since Glover emerged
from a federal prosecution, the special restrictions associated with habeas review did not apply; the analysis might
conceivably have looked rather different had § 2254(d)(1)
governed.
A third source of concern was that the Williams Court
did not expressly limit or modify anything in Strickland,
despite the obvious tension between the cases; indeed,
Williams purported to be nothing more than a straightforward application of the principles announced in Strickland.
The Court may have felt itself hemmed in by § 2254(d)(1)
and related pre-AEDPA decisional law; a habeas case was
not a proper platform for granting relief on the basis of new
legal principles. Yet, whether or not the Court had this end
in view, the failure to limit or distinguish Strickland (which,
after all, dealt with the very same sort of claim that counsel
should have done more to develop mitigation evidence)
only enhanced the discretion the Court had implicitly
reserved for itself through its vague definition of ‘‘unreasonable.’’ In future habeas cases, if the Court were inclined
to grant relief, Williams could be drawn on freely—since
there was nothing ‘‘new’’ in the decision, there was no
retroactivity bar to its use—but if the Court were inclined to
go the other direction, then Strickland could be emphasized
as the controlling precedent.31
C. Williams’ Aftermath: The Court’s Schizophrenic
Jurisprudence, 2000–2009

Given the ambiguities and conflicting agendas embodied in
the Williams majority opinions, it should be no surprise that
the Court’s subsequent ineffective assistance decisions
would display a schizophrenic character. In the first place,
there seemed a basic divide between the Court’s treatment
of ineffective assistance claims in capital and noncapital
cases. In the three noncapital cases between 2003 and
2009 (all arising in habeas), the Court decided in favor of
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the state, noting in each case the deference required by
§ 2254(d)(1).32 Indeed, the Court signaled quite clearly that
it did not think the cases were even close: two of the three
were decided without argument via unanimous per curiam
opinions, and the third was also decided unanimously. If
Williams represented a breakthrough for defendants, that
breakthrough plainly did not extend to noncapital cases.
In the capital cases, by contrast, defendants had at least
a fighting chance of success. The Court, however, did not
follow a consistent path. Williams figured prominently in
these decisions, but sometimes it was the O’Connor opinion that was emphasized (establishing deferential review
under § 2254(d)(1)), and other times it was the Stevens
opinion (overturning the death sentence based on ineffective assistance). In the former cases, the state won; in the
latter, the defendant. If O’Connor and Kennedy really did
intend through Williams to create a great deal of flexibility
for the Court to review death sentences on a case-by-case
basis, they plainly succeeded.
Consider, for instance, Bell v. Cone,33 the Court’s next
ineffective assistance decision after Williams and Glover.
Like Williams, Cone argued that his lawyer failed to present
important mitigating evidence at sentencing. However, the
Court’s discussion of Williams was limited entirely to the
O’Connor opinion and its interpretation of § 2254(d)(1).34
When the time came for the Court to perform its Sixth
Amendment analysis, it was as if Williams did not exist: the
Court made no effort to distinguish Williams on the facts,
did not even mention the ABA standards, and ultimately
relied on Strickland’s ‘‘strong presumption’’ that defense
counsel’s performance was reasonable.35 The Court’s
decision later that year in Woodford v. Visciotti was in much
the same spirit.36
But the following year, in Wiggins v. Smith,37 the Court
proved that the Stevens opinion in Williams had been no
fluke. Once again, the claim was that counsel had failed to
investigate and present important mitigating evidence.
However, Williams was no longer treated as merely an
AEDPA case; rather, the Court observed, Williams was
‘‘illustrative of the proper application of [the Strickland]
standards.’’38 The Court particularly noted Williams’ use of
the ABA standards, and invoked those same standards in
finding that Wiggins’ counsel had failed to render reasonably competent representation.39 The Court also looked to
Williams with respect to the prejudice prong, pointedly
noting that Wiggins’ prejudice case was even stronger than
Williams’ had been.40 Although the Court insisted that
Williams ‘‘made no new law’’ in the ineffective assistance
area,41 it is clear that the Wiggins opinion would have looked
quite different had Williams not been available to draw on.
And now it was the turn of Bell and Woodford to disappear
down the memory hole.
In the years following Wiggins, the Court continued to
go back and forth in the capital cases, with several decisions
drawing sharply worded dissents—in marked contrast to
the consensus prevailing in the noncapital cases. Defendants scored victories in Rompilla v. Beard (2005)42 and

Porter v. McCollum (2009),43 both of which involved claims
like Williams and Wiggins of failure to adequately investigate sentencing issues, and both of which invoked ABA
standards. But defendants making similar claims lost in
Schriro v. Landrigan (2007),44 Bobby v. Van Hook (2009),45
and Wong v. Belmontes (2009).46 Kennedy and O’Connor
(until she left the Court in 2006) continued to serve as the
fulcrum in this line of cases, as they had in Williams; with
the single exception of Kennedy’s dissenting vote in Rompilla, they were always part of the majority. Whether they
led the Court in a coherent or predictable fashion is less
clear. Although it is possible that distinctions might have
been offered to justify each of the decisions relative to
precedent, the Court rarely made much effort to do so.
Rather, it seemed that with each new decision, contrary
precedent was simply ignored. Perhaps this had something
to do with the uncertain status of precedent under
§ 2254(d)(1); or with a desire to preserve flexibility for future
cases; or with the difficulties of cobbling together a majority
around a single, cohesive approach to ineffective assistance.
Whatever the reason, when reviewing the whole line of
ineffective assistance decisions from 2000 to 2009, lower
courts might understandably have felt that the guidance
they were receiving was much less than clear.
II. Making Sense of the Expansive-Right and NarrowRemedy Cases

In this Part, I will carry the story from 2010 to the present
(2012), a time period that saw the Court dramatically
intensify its engagement with ineffective assistance issues,
even relative to 2000–2009, which was itself a relatively
busy period. First, I will describe the expansive-right cases
and then move to the narrow-remedy line.
A. Expansive-Right Cases: The Camel Enters the Tent

I suggested above that it may be helpful to think about
Williams and its progeny as reflective of a more general
heightening of concerns on the Court regarding the death
penalty in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Certainly, this
view is consistent with the marked differences we have seen
in the way the Court handled capital and noncapital cases
from 2000 to 2009. However, the distinction seemed to
break down after 2009, with the expansive-right cases
constituting a migration of Williams’ more robust version
of the Strickland right, and particularly the reliance on formal professional practice standards, from the capital to the
noncapital context. In retrospect, Williams now looks like
the proverbial camel putting its nose in the tent.
First, in Padilla v. Kentucky (2010), the Court addressed
the case of a defendant whose lawyer had incorrectly
advised him regarding the deportation consequences of
a guilty plea.47 The Court rejected the contention that this
sort of advice lay categorically beyond the protection of the
Sixth Amendment and held that Padilla’s lawyer had indeed
violated Strickland’s performance prong. In so doing, the
Court invoked the line of capital cases, including Williams
and Wiggins, in which ABA standards had been used, and
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then drew on ABA standards, National Legal Aid and
Defender Association guidelines, and other professional
norms in support of its conclusion that defense counsel
must advise of deportation consequences, at least when
such consequences are clear.48 With that, the camel was in
the tent. And gone were the days of easy consensus on
ineffective assistance issues in noncapital cases: two justices dissented, and two concurred in judgment only.
Rounding out the expansive-right cases were two
decided on the same day in March 2012. In Missouri v. Frye,
the Court held that the Strickland performance prong was
satisfied when a lawyer failed to communicate a plea offer
to the defendant before the offer expired.49 ABA standards
and state rules of professional responsibility figured
prominently in the analysis.50 Meanwhile, in Lafler v.
Cooper, the Court held that Strickland’s prejudice prong was
satisfied when counsel’s mistaken advice regarding a plea
offer led to the rejection of a favorable plea deal.51 Put
together, Frye and Lafler constitute the Court’s clearest
indication to date that the right to effective assistance
extends in a meaningful way to plea bargaining.
The sequence of Sixth Amendment cases from Williams
to Frye and Lafler seems to parallel a contemporaneous line
of Eighth Amendment cases. The line began in 2002 with
Atkins v. Virginia, in which the Court—also in the spirit of
intensifying its oversight of the death penalty—banned
capital punishment for the mentally retarded.52 Building on
Atkins, the Court then prohibited capital punishment for
juveniles three years later in Roper v. Simmons.53 Atkins and
Roper represented an even more dramatic breakthrough for
defendants in the Eighth Amendment area than Williams
had in the Sixth, for both decisions expressly overturned
recent Supreme Court precedent. Yet, as with the Sixth, the
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence looked very different in
capital and noncapital cases. Indeed, between Atkins and
Roper, the Court rejected Eighth Amendment challenges to
two very long noncapital sentences imposed under
California’s notorious Three Strikes law.54 Finally, the
Eighth Amendment revolution spread to noncapital cases
in 2010, the same year as Padilla, when the Court banned
life without parole for most juveniles in Graham v. Florida.55
In Graham, the Court for the first time in a noncapital case
used the methodology it had developed for addressing
Eighth Amendment challenges to capital sentences.56 The
camel entered the tent.
In the Eighth Amendment cases, the justices have broken down along the same ideological lines as in the Sixth
Amendment sequence from Williams through Frye and
Lafler, with O’Connor (until 2006) and Kennedy almost
always in the majority. Moreover, in the Eighth Amendment cases, the Court has also looked for guidance to what
we might think of as a relevant set of practice norms. In the
Sixth Amendment cases, when reviewing the constitutionality of lawyer performance, the Court has relied on
attorney practice norms; in the Eighth Amendment cases,
when reviewing the constitutionality of state sentencing
‘‘performance,’’ the Court has looked to the norms of other
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states and other nations. In both lines of cases, then, the
Court has treated constitutional law as an open, evolutionary system, which has caused not a little consternation
among the Court’s formalists, who prefer an unchanging,
hermetically sealed system in which meaning is derived
from a fixed body of source materials (constitutional text,
historical documents from the ratification time period, and
perhaps subsequent judicial precedent).57
In any event, we might wonder why the Court has in
both the Sixth and the Eighth Amendment contexts
advanced jurisprudential breakthroughs from the capital to
the noncapital cases. As a practical matter, this largely
becomes a question of why Kennedy has seemingly
embraced more robust constitutional regulation of noncapital cases. It is possible that at some point Kennedy
began to focus in a new way on the extraordinary harshness
of noncapital sentences in the United States. Perhaps the
Three Strikes cases even had something to do with that.
Although Kennedy voted with the majority in both cases to
uphold the challenged sentences, just five months later he
delivered an impassioned and much-noted condemnation
of American sentencing and corrections practices in an
address to the American Bar Association.58 Some of his
comments even seemed to suggest, albeit obliquely, some
misgivings about the Three Strikes decisions.59 Kennedy
seemed especially troubled by inflexibility in American
punishment: by mandatory minimum sentences at the
front end and by an unwillingness or inability on the back
end to provide early release opportunities for offenders who
were truly rehabilitated.60 This same concern with inflexible punishment quite overtly animated Kennedy’s majority
opinion in Graham, which established that most juvenile
offenders must be given a parole opportunity, but may also
have been an important part of the subtext in Padilla, which
dealt with an automatic deportation rule, and in Lafler,
where counsel’s poor advice caused the defendant to
become subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 185
months.61
A heightened interest in noncapital cases across the
2000s might also follow from the steadily declining
salience of capital punishment in the United States. The
annual number of executions peaked at 98 in 1999, and
then dropped in eight of the next eleven years, standing at
only 46 in 2010.62 Similarly, the number of new death
sentences peaked at 315 in 1996, then fell in ten of the next
fourteen years, reaching only 104 in 2010.63 As concerns
regarding arbitrary administration of the death penalty
grew less pressing, it would seem natural for reformminded advocates and jurists to pay greater attention to
injustices in noncapital cases.
Of course, it may be that no single concern or agenda
really links Graham, Padilla, Frye, and Lafler. It may be
a coincidence that these four cases (as well as two others
taking an expansive and arguably unexpected view of Eighth
Amendment rights in the noncapital context, Miller v.
Alabama64 and Brown v. Plata65) were all decided over
a three-year period. Whether intentionally linked or not,
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however, the cases do reflect a distinctive brand of legal
realism—a certain willingness to adapt constitutional
doctrines to make individual rights meaningful in light of
contemporary knowledge and circumstances, even at the
expense in some cases of blurring established capital/
noncapital distinctions.
B. Narrow-Remedy Cases: Circumscribing the Role of
the Lower Federal Courts

At the same time that the Court seemed to be taking an
uncharacteristically expansive view of Strickland rights in
noncapital cases, it also acted to tighten the restrictions of
§ 2254(d)(1) on the power of federal habeas courts to remedy
Strickland violations. Consider, for instance, Harrington v.
Richter (2011), in which the Court overturned a habeas grant
by the Ninth Circuit.66 At one level, this decision might
simply be written off as another in the line of post-Williams
noncapital cases rejecting habeas relief on the basis of
§ 2254(d)(1). In fact, none of the liberal justices bothered to
dissent or otherwise object to the Court’s treatment of
§ 2254(d)(1). On the other hand, it may be significant that
Harrington was the Court’s first ineffective assistance case
after the retirement of Justice Stevens, who had authored
the minimalist interpretation of § 2254(d)(1) in Williams
and then proven himself the Court’s most consistent supporter of habeas petitioners making ineffective assistance
claims. Stevens was the justice most likely to object to any
further tightening of § 2254(d)(1), and there were indeed
several aspects of Harrington that might have given him
pause.
First, there was the Court’s palpable dissatisfaction with
the Ninth Circuit’s decision: the Court’s opinion was not
simply a reversal of the lower court, but a rebuke. In the
opinion’s very first paragraph, for instance, the Ninth
Circuit was said to have committed ‘‘clear error’’ and shown
‘‘disregard’’ for ‘‘sound and established principles.’’67 Later,
the Court accused the Ninth Circuit of ‘‘all but ignor[ing]
the only question that matters under § 2254(d)(1).’’68
Through such strong language, the Court seemed intent on
amplifying its message that habeas courts must be considerably more deferential to state court decisions than the
Ninth Circuit had been.
Second, the Court held that § 2254(d)(1) deference is
required even when the state court gives no reasoning for
its decision.69 The California Supreme Court had rejected
Richter’s Strickland claims in a one-sentence summary
order. Since § 2254(d)(1) mandates deference only to a statecourt ‘‘adjudicat[ion] on the merits,’’ whether the California
Supreme Court’s cursory ‘‘decision’’ qualified was a fair
question. However, the Supreme Court held that it did,
thereby effectively extending § 2254(d)(1) to the summary
orders that have become such a common part of appellate
practice in some jurisdictions.
Finally, the Court reiterated and elaborated at length on
some brief observations made two years earlier, almost in
passing, in Knowles v. Mirzayance.70 Read for all it was
worth, this language from Harrington seemed practically to

raise a categorical bar to habeas relief for Strickland claims.
What Knowles suggested, and Harrington elaborated on, was
that § 2254(d)(1) and Strickland have synergistic effects;
considered together, the relevant legal standards raise
a nearly insurmountable barrier to relief.
Indeed, merely standing alone, § 2254(d)(1) seemed
a higher bar in Harrington than even O’Connor had
envisioned in her opinion in Williams. Here is how the
Harrington Court characterized the test for § 2254(d)(1)’s
‘‘unreasonable application’’ prong:
Under § 2254(d), a habeas court must determine
what arguments or theories supported or, as here,
could have supported, the state court’s decision; and
then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded
jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this court. . . .
...
If this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it
was meant to be. As amended by the AEDPA,
§ 2254(d) stops short of imposing a complete bar
on federal court relitigation of claims already rejected
in state proceedings. It preserves authority to issue
the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court’s
decision conflicts with this Court’s precedents. It
goes no farther. Section 2254(d) reflects the view that
habeas corpus is a ‘‘guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,’’ not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal.
As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from
a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the
state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in
federal court was so lacking in justification that there
was an error well understood and comprehended in
existing law beyond possibility for fairminded
disagreement.71
Other than a brief snippet borrowed from an old (preAEDPA) concurring opinion, all of this super-deferential
verbiage was new in Harrington, and seemed quite close to
a test that O’Connor had expressly rejected in her Williams
opinion.72
In any event, conceived in these terms, the § 2254(d)(1)
standards interacted in two important ways with the ineffective assistance standards. First, since Strickland had
declared that judicial review of counsel’s performance itself
had to be ‘‘highly deferential,’’ review of a state court’s
denial of an ineffective assistance claim must be ‘‘doubly’’
so.73 Second, because the Strickland test was cast in general
terms like ‘‘reasonableness,’’ deference under § 2254(d)(1)
had to be all the greater74; as had been established in
earlier cases, ‘‘[t]he more general the rule, the more leeway
courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case
determinations.’’75
Decided on the same day as Harrington, Premo v. Moore
was in much the same spirit, and indeed quoted Harrington
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at length in discussing the governing legal standards.76
What was different about Premo was that the challenge to
counsel’s performance alleged an over-hasty guilty plea, not
a botched trial strategy. Premo thus gave the Court an
opportunity to expound on the Strickland standards as they
relate to plea bargaining. And, in marked contrast to what
the Court would say on this topic the very next year in Lafler
and Frye, the Court in Premo suggested a special, heightened
deference to counsel’s plea-bargaining efforts, especially in
habeas cases.77
The Court took its stingy approach to habeas relief a step
or two further in Cullen v. Pinholster,78 which involved the
same sort of claim of deficient performance in a capital
sentencing proceeding on which the Court had granted
relief in Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla. Cullen was notable
for at least two reasons. First, the Court held that, for
purposes of § 2254(d)(1), habeas review was limited to the
record developed in the state court.79 This was, of course,
consistent with Harrington’s view that habeas relief was
only for ‘‘extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice
systems,’’ and not merely for saving defendants from substantively incorrect or unjust judgments—if a defendant’s
habeas claim in federal court was largely based on new
evidence, no matter how compelling the evidence was, the
state court’s failure to grant relief on the claim could hardly
be regarded as a systemic malfunction.
Second, the Court’s cavalier treatment of the factually
similar cases of Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla and their
methodology suggests an almost implicit reversal of the
precedent. Rather than engaging in a close comparison of
the cases, the Cullen majority fell back on Strickland’s
mandate of deference, resistance to general rules or
guidelines, and insistence that each case by considered on
its own.80 Indeed, while the dissent emphasized that
counsel’s performance violated ABA guidelines,81 the
majority did not bother even to cite or discuss the guidelines, but instead suggested that the benchmark for attorney performance should not be formal, national standards,
but rather local practice norms82—proof of which would, of
course, be much more difficult for defendants. At a minimum, Cullen raised serious questions about whether the
days of a more relaxed approach to § 2254(d)(1) in capital
cases were at an end.
C. Reconciling the Cases

One way to make sense of the two lines of cases, expansiveright and narrow-remedy, would be to focus on the procedural posture of the cases. All of the narrow-remedy cases
reached the Supreme Court via federal habeas, and were
thus subject to the restrictions of § 2254(d)(1). By contrast,
two of the three expansive-right cases bypassed habeas,
permitting the Court to engage in less deferential review.
We might accordingly draw the lesson that ineffective
assistance claims will fare much better outside the habeas
setting than within, which would be quite consistent with
what the Court itself indicated through the double-deference
language in Harrington.
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I think there is something to this view of the cases,
although it does beg a couple of questions. First, what about
the more flexible approach to § 2254(d(1) that was exemplified by Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla: has the Court
decisively rejected that approach, and, if so, why? I have
suggested that Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla might best
be understood as part of a broader effort by the Court in the
early and mid-2000s to subject the death penalty to more
rigorous constitutional regulation. From that perspective,
Harrington and Premo may be distinguished because they
were noncapital cases. Cullen, though, does not fit the pattern. Perhaps Cullen is a sign that, as the death penalty has
diminished in importance, the Court will no longer treat
capital and noncapital cases differently under § 2254(d)(1).
Or perhaps it is an indication that the Court’s enhanced
Eighth Amendment restrictions on capital punishment
have obviated the perceived need for particular Sixth
Amendment protections. Or perhaps it is a reflection of
personnel changes on the Court; especially decisive may be
the departures of O’Connor, a key swing voter in Williams,
Wiggins, and Rompilla, and Stevens, the Court’s strongest
proponent for ineffective assistance claims in habeas. Or
perhaps Cullen was simply a fluke, or another instance,
like Bell v. Cone, of the Court’s erratic path even in the
capital cases.
Second, what about Lafler? This is the one case in the
recent expansive-right line that does not fit the pattern; it
arose in habeas, and was formally subject to § 2254(d)(1).
The Lafler Court’s own solution to the § 2254(d)(1) dilemma
was to rely on the ‘‘contrary to’’ prong of the statute, rather
than ‘‘unreasonable application,’’ which had been the prong
at issue in the narrow-remedy cases. More specifically, the
Court held that the state court’s decision in Lafler was
contrary to Strickland because the state court had focused
on whether the defendant’s plea was knowing and voluntary, rather than on the Strickland test itself, and ‘‘made an
irrelevant observation about counsel’s performance at trial
and mischaracterized respondent’s claim as a complaint
that his attorney did not obtain a more favorable plea bargain.’’83 But the Court’s expansive approach to ‘‘contrary to’’
in Lafler seems perverse in light of Harrington.84 Under
Harrington, a state court that provides no explanation at all
for its decision gets full § 2254(d)(1) deference, whereas,
under Lafler, a state court that actually supplies reasoning
for its decision—which would seem to be something the
Supreme Court should encourage—runs the risk of saying
something that the Court will construe to be contrary to one
of its precedents. Although Harrington and Lafler may be
able to coexist in some hyper-formal sense, the two are
functionally at odds with one another, leaving it quite
uncertain whether we will continue to see Lafler’s expansive
approach to the ‘‘contrary to’’ prong with any consistency in
the future. In truth, Lafler may have simply ridden the
coattails of Frye; between these two mirror-image cases
decided on the same day, the Court was attempting to
sketch a comprehensive approach to the application of
Strickland to plea bargaining, and the Court may have been
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anxious to avoid muddying the waters by rigorously applying § 2254(d)(1).
In sum, the cases can be reconciled from a formal doctrinal standpoint, albeit not without a certain amount of
tension. There is, however, another, more subtle theme that
ties all of the cases together: a distinct reluctance to give
convicted defendants new trials, even when attorney performance is found inadequate. The narrow-remedy cases
most obviously reflect this reluctance, but it is also
apparent in the expansive-right cases. Padilla, for instance,
only addressed the performance prong of Strickland, and
pointedly declined to decide whether the defendant could
demonstrate prejudice.85
Meanwhile, in Frye, the Court not only remanded the
case for the state court to make a prejudice determination,
as in Padilla, but also went out of its way to indicate that the
defendant would face a difficult hurdle on this score. When
counsel’s incompetence caused the defendant to lose a plea
deal, the Court held, the defendant’s prejudice burden
includes showing ‘‘a reasonable probability the plea would
have been entered without the prosecution canceling it or
the trial refusing to accept it.’’86 This was a real problem for
Frye because he had been arrested on a new offense shortly
after his plea offer expired. Even without such an occurrence, however, it is not entirely clear how a defendant
would persuasively demonstrate that a judge would have
accepted a plea deal, and one imagines a strong temptation
for trial judges—reluctant to reopen cases they had thought
resolved—to deny that they would have accepted the deal.
Finally, Lafler demonstrated that there was yet another
barrier to relief, even if a defendant could get around
§ 2254(d)(1) and satisfy both prongs of Strickland. The
defendant in Lafler managed to do all of these things, but
nonetheless faced a remand to determine the remedy, and
the Court seemed to leave open the possibility that he might
get much less than he wished—indeed, perhaps nothing at
all. In the Court’s view, the question of remedy required
a balancing of competing interests:
Sixth Amendment remedies should be tailored to the
injury suffered from the constitutional violation and
should not unnecessarily infringe on competing
interests. Thus, a remedy must neutralize the taint
of a constitutional violation, while at the same time
not grant a windfall to the defendant or needlessly
squander the considerable resources the State properly invested in the criminal prosecution.87
With these concerns in mind, the Court divided lostplea-deal cases into two categories. First, when the defendant lost an opportunity to plead guilty to a lesser charge,
then the prosecution would be required to reoffer the plea
deal. However, this would not guarantee that the defendant
would actually benefit; ‘‘Once [the plea deal has been
offered again], the judge can then exercise discretion in
deciding whether to vacate the conviction from trial and
accept the plea or leave the conviction undisturbed.’’88 In
the second category, where the lost deal related only to

sentencing and not to counts of conviction, the remedy
would be a resentencing. However, in this category, too, the
judge was granted wide discretion; the judge could choose
among ‘‘the term of imprisonment the government offered
in the plea, the sentence [the defendant] received at trial, or
something in between.’’89 Moreover, with respect to both
categories, the Court indicated that the judge’s exercise of
discretion could take into account a defendant’s earlier
expressed unwillingness to take responsibility for the
offense (which would arguably be present any time a lost
plea deal has resulted in the defendant going to trial) and
‘‘any information concerning the crime that was discovered
after the plea offer was made.’’90 This seems to give the trial
judge ample basis in most cases to reaffirm the original
judgment without fear of appellate reversal. Again, one
imagines a general inclination to do just that.
III. A Path Forward

I’ve suggested two possible accounts of the recent ineffective assistance cases. In one account, habeas bypass plays
a key role. The Court really cares about § 2254(d)(1) and the
underlying policy choices it embodies; ineffective assistance claims in habeas are thus highly unlikely to find
success—perhaps now even in capital cases as much as in
noncapital cases. Outside of habeas, though, the Court is
slowly bringing the more rigorous approach to evaluating
attorney performance that it developed in the capital realm
to a much wider body of cases.
In the alternative account, the Court’s real interest lies
in keeping a tight lid on new trials without entirely
excluding the possibility of relief in the most extreme cases.
In the habeas setting, § 2254(d)(1) is simply a convenient
tool for either denying relief or couching a grant of relief in
such terms that it will have little impact as precedent on
other cases. But, outside of habeas, the Court has plenty of
other tools to accomplish the same ends: the malleable
performance and prejudice tests from Strickland, the
selective use of what is now a large and very mixed bag of
precedent, and Lafler’s highly discretionary, case-specific
approach to remedy.
As a purely explanatory matter, there is probably a certain amount of truth to both accounts. Indeed, how much
§ 2254(d)(1) really matters probably varies from justice to
justice and case to case.
In any event, in this section, I move from the explanatory to the prescriptive. The argument proceeds in three
parts. First, I contend that the Court, in trying to make
sense of its precedent, should embrace the first account—
habeas bypass makes a difference. Second, the Court
should stop taking ineffective assistance cases out of
habeas, and instead focus on using habeas-bypass cases to
clean up some of the mess that ineffective assistance doctrine has become. Finally, in appropriate habeas-bypass
cases, the Court should decisively reject the mushy, indiscriminately deferential performance test of Strickland and
instead develop clearer, more rigorous standards in light of
widely accepted national practice norms. These are not the
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only developments that would make for better ineffective
assistance law, but they seem a feasible path forward in
light of the Court’s most recent decisions.
A. Habeas Bypass Matters

From a formalist perspective, it seems simple enough that
habeas bypass should matter. After all, Congress adopted
a statute, the AEDPA, that imposes particular standards for
habeas claims, and it is conventionally assumed that where
Congress legislates, Congress intends to effectuate change.
This was the thrust of O’Connor’s opinion in Williams. To
take the contrary view—that habeas and habeas bypass are
all the same—would be more in the spirit of the Stevens
opinion, which, of course, failed to secure a majority. And
a host of post-Williams decisions reaffirms, at least at
a rhetorical level, that the AEDPA did indeed make a difference, culminating in the ‘‘double-deference’’ formula of
Harrington.
To be sure, the AEDPA—a poorly drafted, hastily
adopted statute—seems unusually ill-suited for formalist
analysis.91 However, even beyond an imagined legislative
intent, there are other good reasons to think that habeas
bypass should matter.
Indeed, prior to the AEDPA, the Court had for at least
two decades embraced the notion that habeas should be
regarded as a unique procedural setting with particularly
high barriers to relief. Consider, for instance, the plurality
opinion in Teague v. Lane, which established that a habeas
petitioner may not normally take advantage of new rules of
criminal procedure adopted by the Supreme Court after the
petitioner’s conviction became final.92 Teague highlighted
two interests in support of this rule: finality and comity.
Neither interest, however, pushes as strongly against relief
when the Court bypasses habeas.
Finality interests, for instance, grow stronger the further
a case moves from the original trial and conviction. As time
wears on, it becomes increasingly burdensome for the state
to mount a fresh prosecution if a new trial is ordered, and it
becomes decreasingly likely that a fresh trial would produce
reliable results. Evidence will be lost, witnesses will disappear or become incapacitated, memories will fade, and so
forth. The flipside, though, is that the Supreme Court
should have considerably less fear of delivering a windfall to
a defendant or an unfair burden to the state when it awards
relief prior to federal habeas proceedings.
Comity interests—that is, the federal system’s interest
in showing respect for state courts and state law—may also
be less compelling in the habeas-bypass setting. First, when
§ 2254(d)(1) does not apply, the Court can overturn a state
decision as incorrect without labeling it unreasonable,
which may take some of the sting out of the reversal. Second, when the Court does overturn a conviction in habeas,
that decision provides at least marginal encouragement for
lower federal courts also to grant relief in other cases notwithstanding § 2254(d)(1), and one imagines that reversals
by the lower federal courts—especially single-judge district
courts and three-judge circuit panels—are perceived as
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a much greater affront by state courts than reversals by the
larger and more prestigious Supreme Court. By contrast,
when the Court grants relief in a habeas-bypass case,
§ 2254(d)(1) is not weakened and indeed remains as a barrier for lower federal courts to treat the new Supreme Court
decision as controlling precedent in other habeas cases.
In sum, the force of finality and comity interests seems
attenuated in habeas-bypass cases, which supports treating
them differently.
B. No More Ineffective Assistance Cases in Habeas

Reviewing the whole line of cases from Williams through
Lafler, one cannot avoid the sense that the Court has veered
unpredictably back and forth in its openness to ineffective
assistance claims in habeas. The Court’s approach has
created a mass of poorly reconciled precedent, with many of
the holdings based on fact-intensive, case-specific analysis.
There seems little clear guidance here for lower courts.
Future habeas cases are unlikely to clarify matters.
Section 2254(d)(1) and Teague prevent the Court from
developing new rules in habeas cases in support of relief; if
the Court wants to grant relief, it must act as if relief follows
inexorably from the vague mandates of Strickland itself. The
result is simply a piling on of more inconsistent precedent.
In any event, the project of clarifying the habeas standards hardly seems worth the effort. When the Court
decides a habeas-bypass case, it tells us what the Constitution means. Its words reverberate throughout the legal
system, providing guidance to all courts at all levels. But,
when the Court decides a habeas case, it speaks not to the
meaning of the Constitution, but to the much more obscure
question of whether a particular interpretation or application of the Constitution was unreasonable at the time it was
made in light of then-existing Supreme Court precedent
(which may well have been subsequently superseded). The
Court speaks to federal habeas courts, not the legal system
as a whole, and the odd, AEDPA-based terminology it uses
seems as likely to confuse as to illuminate matters in the
state courts. Rather than spending its time trying to give
more precise content to habeas-specific concepts like
Harrington’s double deference—a project that seems likely
to conjure images of angels and heads of pins—the Court
would do better to focus on elucidating the basic right to
effective assistance itself.
Cullen, moreover, has largely undermined the strongest
practical reason for the Court to wait to take ineffective
assistance cases until after lower-court habeas proceedings.
In principle, federal district courts might have had a useful
role to play in conducting evidentiary hearings on disputed
factual matters. However, Cullen eliminates this role in
cases subject to § 2254(d)(1), since the decision under this
section must now be made based solely on the state court
record. With the record frozen when state court proceedings end, the Supreme Court gains nothing by waiting for
lower-court proceedings in habeas.
To be sure, the Court may be concerned about intercircuit disparities in habeas cases, and particularly that
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some circuits will grant habeas relief too liberally without
Supreme Court oversight. It is important to remember,
though, that the AEDPA and pre-AEDPA decisional law
impose a host of additional constraints on habeas beyond
§ 2254(d)(1). What I propose is only that each circuit be left
to its own devices in deciding how § 2254(d)(1) applies to
Strickland claims. It seems unlikely that any more than
a few isolated defendants would manage to evade the many
other limitations on habeas relief in order to benefit from
a possible loosening of § 2254(d)(1) limitations in some
circuits. The most comprehensive empirical study of postAEDPA habeas found an effective relief rate of 0.64%.93
Given what appears to be a powerful, pervasive disinclination among federal courts to grant habeas relief, subtle
changes in the Supreme Court’s role hardly seem likely to
throw open the prison doors. This seems all the less likely
in an area in which the Court’s role has been as equivocal as
it has with respect to the application of § 2254(d)(1) to
Strickland.
C. Use of Established Professional Norms

As the Court has recognized ever since Strickland, ABA
standards and other established professional norms seem
a natural benchmark for judging attorney performance.
However, in Strickland itself and in many subsequent cases,
the Court has hastened to add that ‘‘they are only guides’’
and has given them little or no discernible weight. Williams
marked a partial shift in the capital context, and Padilla
extended the breakthrough in a noncapital case. As Cullen
demonstrates, however, the Court’s use of professional
norms remains inconsistent even in capital cases.
The inconsistencies may, in part, reflect the peculiarities
of habeas. Because the Court cannot, in theory, make new
law in habeas cases, the Court has been unable to move
decisively beyond Strickland’s equivocation on professional norms. Although Williams also remains available as
precedent, Williams purported to do no more than apply
Strickland, so it has remained easy for the Court to overlook Williams and perpetuate the Strickland approach.
Habeas bypass presents an opportunity to transcend
these dynamics. In an appropriate bypass case, the Court
can and should expressly repudiate Strickland’s
equivocation.
Strickland’s reservations on professional norms purportedly stemmed from their lack of flexibility: ‘‘No particular set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can
satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances
faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate
decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal
defendant.’’94 Yet, the ABA Standards are hardly a straitjacket; many are framed in flexible terms,95 and those with
less flexibility do seem quite basic, general requirements
for good legal representation.96 And, of course, at least two
alternatives were available to address any undue rigidity: the
standards could have been made subject to a rebuttable
presumption of correctness, or handled through a ‘‘selective
incorporation’’ approach, in which individual standards

could be given special weight and others discarded as inappropriate for the constitutional analysis.
Strickland’s equivocation likely reflects a combination of
additional concerns beyond inflexibility, but these do not
seem especially weighty today. For instance, Strickland was
a capital case, and the majority’s analysis may in part reflect
the broader efforts of an increasingly conservative Court in
the 1980s to diminish judicial interference with state
administration of the death penalty. Such an agenda, however, seems much less compelling today, in the wake of so
many exonerations in the 1990s and with many states
moving decisively away from capital punishment.
Likewise, Strickland was a habeas case, and may in part
reflect the Court’s broader efforts to rein in habeas in that
time period. Importantly, Teague had not yet been decided,
which raised the specter of a flood of new habeas litigation
every time the Court adopted an expansive new interpretation of a constitutional right. Now, with Teague’s retroactivity
rule in place, and—perhaps even more importantly—with
the many AEDPA restrictions also on the books, the Court
can more freely strengthen constitutional rights without fear
that large numbers of convictions will be overturned through
habeas.
More generally, hindsight has taught us that there was
a fatal flaw in the Strickland Court’s strategy to prevent
a ‘‘proliferation of ineffectiveness challenges.’’ The vague
performance standard, intended to discourage ineffectiveness claims, may instead have created, as David Cole puts it,
‘‘the worst of all possible outcomes’’:
Because the standard is fairly open-ended, and does
not have the clarity of a ‘‘guidelines’’ approach, it
does little to forestall the filing of ineffectiveness
claims. And because the Court’s standard uncritically accepts the status quo as ‘‘effective,’’ it creates
no incentive for states to improve on existing standards of legal representation for the poor.97
To the extent that the Strickland Court feared giving
windfalls to clearly guilty defendants even outside habeas,
that concern should be allayed by the prejudice prong.
Perhaps the Court lacked confidence back in 1984 that
lower courts would take seriously the limitations of the
prejudice prong. If so, nearly three decades of experience
should lay those concerns to rest; there is no evidence that
lower courts have been anything approaching profligate in
awarding relief on ineffective assistance claims.98
In setting forth the ineffectiveness standards in 1984,
the Court was embarking on what was, for it, uncharted
waters. In that context, it is understandable that the Court
would have found attractive a deferential, go-slow, case-bycase approach. Now, however, the Court has a great deal of
experience with adjudicating ineffective assistance claims.
For the Court to continue to adhere to a fact-intensive, casespecific mode of analysis leaves the lower courts without
clear guidance for no good reason. The result is seemingly
arbitrary differences in the treatment of cases, and a failure
to establish any real accountability for lawyers—and, for
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that matter, the states who systematically underfund indigent defense—when legal representation violates established, straightforward, commonsensical practice norms.
The most recent habeas-bypass cases, Padilla and Frye,
point to the way out of the current mess. The Court’s next
step should be to make explicit what is implicit in Padilla
and Frye: that the Court has moved beyond Strickland’s
equivocation (at least when it is not shackled to Strickland by
§ 2254(d)(1)), and the lower courts should follow suit.
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IV. Conclusion

I have developed something of a contrarian argument in
this article. Whereas the conventional wisdom sees the
AEDPA as a disaster for defendants, I suggest that the
statute may instead free the Court to adopt more robust
interpretations of constitutional rights in habeas-bypass
cases. The Court has long had deep reservations about
habeas, and not without good reason. The AEDPA,
however, gives the Court more freedom to expand constitutional rights without fear of unleashing a torrent of new
habeas claims and throwing open the prison doors to large
numbers of guilty, dangerous inmates.99
There is perhaps no more important area for the Court
to take advantage of this ‘‘freedom’’ than in the field of
ineffective assistance, particularly as it relates to plea bargaining. With few cases going to trial any more, and with
judge and jury unable to do much to protect defendants
when there is no trial, effective representation by defense
counsel in preparation for and during plea bargaining may
be the linchpin to the fairness and reliability of the entire
criminal-justice system.
Whether the Court will move forward in this area is
uncertain: Padilla, Frye, and Lafler contain plenty of equivocations of their own. Exorcising Strickland’s ghost is an
important next step, but even that would hardly ensure
meaningful accountability for incompetent lawyers and
stingy states. The Court will likely require continued prodding, for instance, to tighten up the weak remedy standards
sketched in Lafler. In all of this, as I suggested at the outset,
state courts and state postconviction counsel may have an
especially important role to play—all the more so to the
extent that the lower federal courts are being effectively
sidelined by the AEDPA.
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